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MAsTERSON V. SINE

[68 C.2d

[Sac. No. 7725. In Bank. Feb. 6, 1968.]

REBECCA D. MASTERSON et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. LU E. SINE et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] Vendor and· Purchaser-Option to Repurchase-Oonstruction:
Extrinsic Evidence.-In construing the grantors' option to repurchase in a deed conveying their ranch, the court properly
admitted extrinsic evidence to render the repurchase priee
sufficiently certain to permit specific performance by showing
that such price, described in the deed as " . •• the same consideration as being paid heretofore plus. • • depreciation
value of any improvements •• .I' was meant by the grantors
and grantees to be $50,000 plus expenditures for improvements
by the grantees less depreciation allowable under federal income tax regulations at the time of exercising the option.
[2] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Rule.-When the parties to a
written contract have agreed to it as an "integration," namely,
a complete and final embodiment of the terms of the agreement, parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary its
terms.

'

[3] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence: Exceptions to Rule-Where-Agreement Is Incomplete.-When only part of a written contract is
integrated, parol evidence cannot be used to add to or vary the
terms of that part, but parol evidence may be. used to prove
elements of the agreement not reduced to writing.
[4] !d.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule-Test of Oompleteness.-The crucial issue in determining whether there has
been an integration is whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement.
[6] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule--Test of Oompleteness: Prior or Oontemporaneous Agreements.-The circnunstances at the time of writing a contract may aid in determining whether the parties intended it to be integrated, and
any collateral agreement must be examined to determine
whether the parties intended the subjects of negotiation it
dealt with to be included in, excluded from or otherwise affected by the writing, even though the written contract may
[5] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 266; Am.Jur.2d, Evidenee,
§§ 1049, 1050.
:HeX. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 40, 99;
Evidenee, §§ 348, 398; [2] Evidence, § 327; [3] Evidence, §§ 327,
364; [4] Evidence, § 366; [5] Evidence, §§ 366,376; [6] Evidence,
§ 375; [7] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 40, 99; Evidence, §§ 348, 398;
Assignments, § 22; (8,9] Assignments, § 22.
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have expressed the parties' intention to nullify antecedent
understandings or agreements.
[6] Id.-Extrinsic Evidence-Exceptions to Rule-Prior or Contemporaneous Agreements-When Inadmissible.-Evidence of
oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the
fact finder is likely to be misled.
['1a, 7b] Vendor and Purchaser-Option to Repurchase-Construction: Extrinsic Evidence.-In a nonjury declaratory relief action by a bankrupt's wife and trustee in bankruptcy to establish their right to enforce an option to repurchase a ranch that
the bankrupt and his wife, as tenants in eommon, had con\'veyed to his sister and brother-in-law, it was reversible error
to exclude extrinsic evidence offered to show that the parties
. had agreed that the option was personal to the grantors so as
to keep the property in the family, where the option clause ill
the deed of conveyance, silent on the question of assignability,
did not explicitly provide that it contained the complete agreement, and where, in light of the grantors' inexperience in land
transactions, the condition of .nonassignability might "naturally" have been made the subject of a separate collateral agreement.
:
[8] Assignment-Rights Assignable-Stipulations Against Assignment.-In the absence of a controlling statute the parties may
provide that a contract right or duty is nontransferable.
[9] Id.-Rights Assignable-Stipulations Against AssignmentImplied.-Even when there is no explicit agreement, written or
oral, that contractual duties shall be personal, courts will effectuate a presumed intent to that effect if the circumstances
indicate that performance by a substituted person would be
different from that contracted for.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Glenn
County. Richard E. Patton, Judge.· Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief to establish plaintiff's right
to enforce an option to repurchase certain real property.
Judgment declaring plaintiff's right to exercise the option
reversed.
Rawlins Coffman and Noel Watkins for Defendants and
Appellants.
[7] Admissibility of parol evidence with respect to reservations

or exceptions upon conveyance of real property, note, 61 A.L.R.2d
1390.
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Assignments, § 17; Am.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 22.
• Aasiped by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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Glicksberg, Kushner & Goldberg, Lawrence Goldberg, Truce
& Veal, Harlan Veal and Huard F. Geis for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-DaUas Masterson and his wife Rebecca
owned a ranch as tenants in common. On February 25, 1958,
they conveyed it io Medora and Lu Sine by a grant deed "Reserving unto the Grantors herein an option to purchase the
above described property on or before February 25, 1968" for
the "same consideration as being paid heretofore plus their
depreciation value of any improvements Grantees may add to
the property from and after two and a half years from this
date." Medora is Dallas' sister and Lu's wife. Since the conveyance Dallas has been adjudged bankrupt. His trustee in
bankruptcy and Rebecca brought this declaratory relief action to establish their right to enforce the option.
'I'he case was tried without a jury. Over defendants' objection the trial court admitted extrinsic evidence that by "the
same consideration as being paid heretofore" both the grantors and the grantees meant the sum of $50,000 and by "depreciation value of any improvements" they meant the depreciation value of improvements to be co~puted by deducting from the total amount of any capital expenditures made
by defendaritsgrantees the amount of depreciation allowable
to them under United States income tax regulations as of the
time of the exercise of the option.
The court also determined that the parol evidence rule .precluded admission of extrinsic evidence offered by defendants
to show that the parties wanted the property kept in the Masterson family and that the option was therefore personal to the
grantors and could not be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy.
The court entered judgment for .plaintiffs, declaring their
right to exercise the option, specifying in some detail how it
could be exercised, and reserving jurisdiction to supervise the
manner of its exercise and to determine the amount that plaintiffs will be required to pay defendants for their capital expenditures if plaintiffs decide to exercise the option.
[1] Defendants appeal. They contend that thc option provision is too uncertain to be enforced and that extrinsic evidence as to its meaning should not have been admitted. The
trial court properly refused to frustrate the obviously declared intention of the grantors to reserve an option to repurchase by an overly meticulous insistence on completeness and

)
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clarity of written expression. (See California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 474, 481 [289
P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496] ; Rivers v. Beadle (1960) 183 Cal.
App.2d 691,695-697 [7 Cal.Rptr. 170].) It properly admitted
extrinsic evidence to explain the language of the deed (Nofziger v. Holman (1964) 61 Cal.2d 526, 528 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 384,
393 P.2d 696] ; Barham v. Barham (1949) 33 Cal.2d 416, 422423 [202 P.2d 289] ; Union Oil Co. v. Union Sugar Co. (1948)
31 Cal.2d 300, 306 [188 P.2d 470] ; Schmidt v. Maceo Constr.
Co. (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 717,730 [260 P.2d 230] ; see Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts (1967) 76 Yale
L.J. 939, 959-965; Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and
the Parol Evidence Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161) to the
end that the consideration for the option would appear with
sufficient certainty to permit specific enforcement (see McKeon v. Santa Claus of Cal., Inc. (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 359,
364 [41 Cal.Rptr. 43] ; Vurrow v. Timmsen (1963) 223 Ca1.
App.2d 283, 288 [35 Cal.Rptr. 668, 100 A.L.R.2d 544]). The
trial court erred, however, in excluding the extrinsic evidence
that the option was personal to the grantors and therefore nonassignable.
[2] When the parties to a written contract have agreed to
it as an "integration"-a complete and final embodiment of
the terms of an agreement-parol evidence cannot be used to
add to or vary its terms. (Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 676, 679-680 [16 Cal.Rptr. 345, 365.P.2d
401] ; Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Ca1.2d 458, 465 [241 P.2d
4] ; see 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 573, p. 357; Rest., Contracts (1932) §§ 228 (and com. a), 237 ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1856;
Civ. Code, § 1625.) [3] When only part of the agreement
is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, but parol evidence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not reduced to writing. (Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods Co. (1964)
61 Cal.2d 571, 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529, 394 P.2d 65] ; Schwartz
v. Shapiro (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 250 [40 Cal.Rptr. 189] ;
Mangini v. Wolfschmidt, Ltd. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 192,
200-201 [331 P.2d 728] ; Rest., Contracts (1932) § 239.)
[4] The crucial issue in determining whether there has
been an integration is whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement.
[5] The instrument itself may help to resolve that issue. It
may state, for example, that "there are no previous understandings or agreements not contained in the writing," and
118 C.2d-8
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thus express the parties' "intention to nullify antecedent understandings or agreements." (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960)
§ 578, p. 411.) Any such collateral agreement itself must be
examined, however, to determine whether the parties intended
the subjects of negotiation it deals with to be included in, excluded from, or. otherwise affected by the writing. Circumstances at the time of the writing may also aid in the determination of such integratIon. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960)
§§ 582-584; McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 216, p. 441; 9
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2430, p. 98, § 2431, pp.
102-103; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 721; Schwartz
v. Shapiro, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 251, fn. 8; contra, 4
Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 633, pp. 1014-1016.)
California cases have. stated that whether there was an integration is to be determined solely from the face of the instrument (e.g., Thoroman v. David (1926) 199 Cal. 386, 389-390
[249 P. 513] ;' Heffner v. Gross (1919) 179 Cal. 738, 742-743
[178 P. 860]; Gardiller v. McDonogh (1905) 147 Cal. 313, 318321 [81 P. 964] ; Harrison v. McOormick (1891) 89 Cal. 327,
330 [26 P. 830,23 Am.St.Rep. 469]), and that the question for
the court is whetller it "appears to be a complete . . . agreement. . . ." (See Ferguson v. ICoch (1928) 204 Cal. 342, 346
[268 P. 342, 58 A.L.R. 1176] ; Harrison v. McOurmick, supra,
89 Cal. 327, 330.) Neither of these strict formulations of the
rule, however, has been consistently applied. The requirement
that the writing must appear incomplete on its face has been
repudiated in many cases where parol evidence was admitted
"to prove the existence of a separatc oral agreement as to any
matter on which the document is silent and which is not inconsistent with its terms "--even though the iustrument appeared to state a complete agreement. (E.g., Americall Industrial Sales Oorp. v. A.irscope, Inc. (1955) 44 Ca1.211 393, 397
[282 P.2d 504, 49 A.L.R.2d 1344]; Stockburger v. Dolan
(1939) 14 Ca1.2d 313,317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.IJ.H. 8:1] ; Orall'ford v. France (1933) 219 Cal. 439, 443 [27 P.2rl M5] ; B1wl.·ner v. A.. Leon & 00. (1928) 204 Cal. 225, 227 f2(;7 P. 693] ;
Sivers v. Si'L'ers (1893) 97 Cal. 518, 521 [32 P. 571] ; cf. Simmons v. California Institute of Technology (1949) 34 Cal.2d
264,274 [209 P.2d 581].) Even under the rule that the writing
alone is to be c!ll1!!llltrd, it was found necessary to eXaJuin,>
the alleged co11at('ral fI~reenH'llt bC'fore concluding that proof
of it was precluded by the writiult nlonl'. (See 3 Corbiu, Clllltracts (1960) § 582, pp. 444-446.) 1t is tl1er('fore evid('ut thnt
"The conct'ption of a \Vritin~.(" IlS WllOlIy and illlrinsiclllI~' ~",If
determinative of the parties' intent to maIm it a sole memorial

)
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of one or seven or twenty-seven subjects of negotiation is an
impossible one." (9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2431,
p. 103.) For example, a promissory note given by a debtor to
his creditor may integrate all their present contractual rights
and obligations, or it may be only a minor part of an underlying executory contract that would never be discovered by
examining the face of the note.
In formulating the rule governing parol evidence, several
policies must be accommodated. One policy is based on the
assumption that written evidence is more accurate than human memory. (Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co. (1908)
153 Cal. 585, 595 [96 P. 319].) This policy, however, can be
adequately ~rved by excluding parol evidence of agreements
that directly contradict the writing. Another policy is based
on the fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses
interested in the outcome of the litigation will mislead the
finder of facts. (Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co.,
supra, 153 Cal. 585, 596; Mitchill v. Lath (1928) 247 N.Y.
377,388 [160 N.E. 646, 68 A.L.R. 239] [dissenting opinion by
Lehman, J.] ; see 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2431,
p. 102; Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification
(1966) 4 Duquesne L.Rev. 337, 338-339.) McCormick has suggested that the party urging the spoken as against the written word is most often the economic underdog, threatened by
severe hardship if the writing is enforced. In his view the
parol evidence rule arose to allow the court to control the tendency of the jury to find through sympathy and without a dispassionate assessment of the probability of fraud or faulty
memory that the parties made an oral agreement collateral
to the written contract, or that preliminary tentative agreements were not abandoned when omitted from the writing.
(See McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 210.) He recognizes,
however, that if this theory were adopted in disregard of all
other considerations, it would lead to the exclusion of testimony concerning oral agreements whenever there is a writing
and thereby often defeat the true intent of the parties. (See
McCormick, op. cit. supra, § 216, p. 441.)
[6] Evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is likely to be misled. The
rule must therefore be based on the credibility of the evidence.
One such standard, adopted by section 240(1) (b) of the Restatement of Contracts, permits proof of a collateral agreement if it "is such an agreement as might naturally be made
as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties
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to the written contract." (Italics added; see McCormick,
Evidence (1954) § 216, p. 441; see also 3 Corbin, Contracts
(1960) § 583, p. 475, § 594, pp. 568-569; 4 Williston, Contracts
(3d ed. 1961) § 638, pp. 1039-1045.) The draftsmen of the
Uniform Commercial Code would exclude the evidence in
still fewer instan!!es: "If the additional terms are such that,
if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in
the document in the view of the court, then evidence of their
alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.'.' (Com. 3,
§ 2-202, italics added.)1
[7a] The option clause in the deed in the present case
does not explicitly provide that it contains the complete agreement, and the deed is silent on the question of assignability.
Moreover, the difficulty of accommodating the formalized
structure of a deed to the insertion of collateral agreements
makes it less likely that all the terms of such an agreement
were included.:! (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 587; 4
Williston, Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 645; 70 A.L.R. 752; 759
(1931); 68 A.L.R. 245 (1930).) The statement of the reservation of the option might well have been placed in the recorded
deed solely to preserve the grantors' rights against any possible future purchasers, and this function could well be served
without any-mention of the parties' agreement that the option
was personal. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
the parties to this family transaction, through experience in
land transactions or otherwise, had any warning of the disadvantages of failing to put the whole agreement in the deed.
This case is one, therefore, in which it can be said that a collateral agreement such as that alleged "might naturally be
made as a separate agreement." A fortiori, the case is not one
lCorbin suggests that, even in situations where the court concludes that
it would not have been natural for the parties to make the alleged
collateral oral agreement, parol evidence of sueh an agreement should
nevertheless be permitted if the court is convinced that the unnatural
actually happened in the case being adjudicatcd. (3 Corbin, Contracts,
§ 485, pp. 478, 480; cf. Murray, The !'arol Evidence Rule: A Olarification
(1966) 4 Duquesne L. Rev. 337, 341-342.) This suggestion may be based
on a belief that judges are not likely to be misled by their sympathies.
If the COUI·t believes that the parties intended a collateral agreement to
be effective, there is no reaRon to keep the evidence from the jury.
2See G~ble v. Dotson (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d272 [21 CaI.Rptr. 769),
where the deed given by a real estate developer to the plaintiffs contained
a condition that grantees would not build a pier or boathouse. Despite
this reference in the deed to the subject of berthing for boats, the court
allowed plaintiffs to prove by parol evidence that the condition was
agreed to in return for the developer's oral promise that plaintiffs were
to have the use of two boat spaces nearby.

_. - - .
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in which the parties "would certainly" have included the
collateral agreement in the deed.
It is contended, however, that an option agreement is ordinarily presumed to be assignable if it contains no provisions
forbidding its transfer or indicating that its performance involves elements personal to the parties. (Mott v. Cline (1927)
200 Cal. 434, 450 [253 P. 718]; Altman v. Blewett (1928) 93
Cal ..A.pp. 516, 525 [269 P. 751].) The fact that there is a written memorandum, however, does not necessarily pr~clude
parol evidence rebutting a term that the law would otherwise
presume. In American Industrial Sales Corp. v. Airscope,
Inc., supra, 44 Ca1.2d 393, 397-398, we held it proper to admit parol evidence of a contemporaneous collateral agreement
as to the place of payment of a note, even though it contradicted the presumption that a note, silent as to the place of
payment, is payable where the creditor resides. (For other examples of this approach, see Richter v. Union Land etc. Co.
(1900) 129 Cal. 367, 375 [62 P. 39] [presumption of time of
delivery rebutted by parol evidence] ; Wolters v. King (1897)
119 Cal. 172, 175-176 [51 P. 35] [presumption of time of payment rebutted by parol evidence]; Mangini v. Wolfschmidt,
Ltd., supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 192, 198-201 [presumption of
duration of an agency contract rebutted by parol evidence] ;
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1957) 148 Cal..A.pp.2d 56, 73-74 [306
P.2d 1017]; see also Rest., Contracts, § 240, com. C.)3 Of
course a statute may preclude parol evidence to rebut a statutory presumption. (E. G. Neff v. Ernst (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 628,
635 [311 P.2d 489] [commenting on Civ. Code, § 1112] ; Kilfoy v. Fritz (1954) 125 Cal..A.pp.2d 291, 293-294 [270 P.2d
800unsel for plaintiffs direct our attention to numerous eases that they
contend establish that parol evidence may never be used to show a collateral agreement contrary to a term that the law presumes in the
absence of an agreement. In each of these eases, however, the decision
turned upon the court's belief that the writing was a complete integration and was no more than an application of the rule that parol evidence
cannot be used to vary the terms of a completely integrated agreement.
(Of. discussion in Mangini v. Wolfscllmidt, Ltd., 8upra, 165 Cal.App.2d
192, 203.) In Gardiner v. McDonogh, supra, 147 Cal. 313, 319, defendants sought to prove a collateral agreement that beans sold them were
to conform to a sample earlier given. The court purportedly looked only
to the face of the writing to decide whether parol evidence was admissi·
ble, and such evidence would be excluded if the writing was "clear and
complete." Defendants argued that the written order was not complete
because it did not fix a time and place of delivery, but the court answered
that the failure to state those t.erms did not result in incompleteness
because the law would supply them by implication. This decision was
based on the belief that the question of admissibility had to be decided
from the face of the instrument alone. Virtually every writing leaves
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579] [applying Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act. 652, § 15(a)] ;
see also Com. Code, § 9-318, subd. (4).) Here, however, there
is no such statutc. [8] In the absence of a controlling statute the parties may provide that a contract right or duty is
nontransferable. (La Rue v. Groezinger (1890) 84 Cal. 281,
283 [24 P. 42, 18 Am.St.Rep. 179]; Benton v. Hofmann Plastering Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 61, 68 [24 Cal.Rptr. 268] ;
Parkinson v. Caldwell (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 548, 552-553
[272 P.2d 934] ; see 4 Corbin, Contracts (1951) §§ 872:873~)
[9] Moreover, even when t.here is no explicit agreementwritten or oral-that contractual duties shall be personal,
courts will effectuate a presumed intent to that effect if the
circumstances indicate that performance by a substituted
person would be different from that contracted for. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 208, 222 [308
P.2d 732, 66 A.L.R.2d 590] ; Prichard v. Kimball (1923) 190
Cal. 757, 764-765 [214 P. 863] ; Simmons v. Zimmerman (1904)
144 Cal. 256, 260-261 [79 P. 451, 1 Ann.Cas. 850] ; La Rue v.
Groezinger, supra, 84 Cal. 281, 285; Coykendall v. Jackson
some terms to be implied and almost none would qualify as integrations
without implying some terms. The deciHion was therefore a product of
an outmoded approach to the parol evidence rule, Dot of any compUlsion
to give conclusive. effect to ]lresuUll'tions of imlllied terms.
In Standard BOlli CO. v. Mutual Biscuit Co. (1909) 10 Cal.App. 746,
750 [103 P. 938], the rationale of Gardiner v. McDonogh was extended
to exclude evidence of an agreement for a time of performance other
than tlte .. reasonable time" implied by law in a situation where the
writing, although stating no time of performanee, was •• clear and complete when aided by that which is imported into it by legal implication."
'I'his decision was simply an application of the then-current theory regarding integration. The court regarded the instrument as a complete integration, and it therefore precluded proof of collateral agreements. Since it
is now clear that integration cannot be determined from the writing
alone, the decision is not authoritative insofar as it finds a complete
integration. There is no reason to believe that the eourtgave any independent significance to implied terms. Had the court found from the
writing alone that there was no integration, there is nothing to indicate
that it would have excluded proof contrary to terms it would have otherwise presumed.
In Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co. (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 700, 710
[4 Cal.Bptr. 103], the court refused to admit parol evidence showing a
collateral oral agreement that a buyer would have more than the •• reasonable time" presumed by law to refuse goods, but the decision is based
on a conclusion that the writing on its face was a complete expression
of the agreement. In La Francc v. Kashis1lian (1928) 204 Cal. 643, 645
[269 P. 655], and Fogler v. Pur7&iser (1932) 127 Cal.App. 554, 559-560
[16 P.2d 305], there are no clear findings concerning the completeness
of the writings: but the argument in each case is borrowed from the
Standard BOlli Co. decision and thus implies a finding of a complete
integration. Calpetro Producers Syndicate v. C. M. Woods Co. (1929)
206 Cal. 246, 247-248, 252 [274 P. 65], relies on Standard BOlli Co. and
expressly finds a complete integration.

1
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(1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 729, 731 [62 P.2d 746]; see 4 Corbin,
Contracts (1951) § 865; 3 Williston, Contracts (3d cd. 1960)
§ 412, pp. 32-33; Rest., Contracts (Tent. Draft No.3, 1967)
§ 150(2).)
[7b] In the present case defendants offered evidence that
the parties agreed that the option was not assignable in order
to keep the property in the Masterson family. The trial court
erred in excluding that evidence.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J.,
concurred.
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion:
(1) Undermines the parol evidence rule as we have known
it in this state since at least 18721 by declaring that parol evidence should have been admitted by the trial court to SllOW
that a written option, absolute and unrestricted in form, WLlS
intended to be limited and nonassignable;
(2) Renders suspect instruments of conveyance absolutc
on their face;
(3) Materially lessens the reliance which may be placed
upon written instruments affecting the title to real estatc; and
(4) Opens the door, albeit unintentionally, to a new tecl1nique for the defrauding of creditors.
The opinion permits defendants to establish by parol testimony that their grant 2 to their brother (and brother-in-law)
of a written option, absolute in terms, was nevertheless agreed
to be nonassignable by the grantee (now a bankrupt), and that
therefore the right to exercise it did not pass, by operation of
the bankruptcy laws, to the trustee for the benefit of the
grantee's creditors.
And how was this to be shown T By the proffered testimony
of the bankrupt optionee himself! Thereby one of his assets
(the option to purchase defendants' California ranch) would
be withheld from the trustee in bankruptcy and from the
bankrupt's creditors. Understandably the trial court, as required by the parol evidence rule, did not allow the bankrupt
by parol to so contradict the unqualified language of the written option.
lIn that year the Legislature set forth the rule in sections 1625 of the
Civil Code and 1856 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
!!Th~ option wnR ill thl' form of a res('r\'ation in a dped; however, in
legal c11' .. c-l it is the same :IS if it haJ hcell cOlltaiu('(\ ill a sCI':lratc <1oculUcut.
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The court properly admitted parol evidence to explain the
intended meaning of the "same consideration" and "depreciation value" phases of the written option to purchase defendants' land, as the intended meaning of those phrases was
not clear. However, there was nothing ambiguous about the
granting language. of the option and not the slightest suggestion in the document that the option was to be nonassignable.
Thus, to permit such words of limitation to be added by parol
is to contradict the absolute nature of the grant, and to
directly violate the parol evidence rule.
Just as it is unnecessary to state in a deed to "lot X" that
the house located thereon goes with the land, it is likewise unnecessary to add to "I grant an option to Jones" the words
"and his assigns" for the option to be assignable. As hereinafter emphasized in more detail, California statutes expressly
declare that it is assignable, and only if I add language in
writing showing my intent to withhold or restrict the right of
assignment may the grant be so limited. Thus, to seek to rei strict the grant by parol is to contradict the written document in violation of the parol evidence rule.
The majority opinion arrives at its holding via a series of
false premises which are not supported either in the record of
this case or i~ such California authorities as are offered.
The parol evidence rule is set forth in clear and definite
language in the statutes of this state. (Civ. Code, § 1625; Code
Civ. Proc., § 1856.) It "is not a rule of evidence but is one of
substantive law. . .. The rule as applied to contracts is simply that as a matter of substantive law, a certain act, the act
of embodying the complete terms of an agreement in a writing
(the 'integration'), becomes the contract of the parties."
(Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 465 [1, 2] [241 P.2d
4], quoting from Estate of Gaines (1940) 15 Cal.2d 255, 264265 [100 P.2d 1055].) The rule is based upon the sound principle that the parties to a written instrument, after committing their agreement to or evidencing it by the writing, are not
permitted to add to, vary or contradict the terms of the writing by parol evidence. As aptly expressed by the author of the
present majority opinion, speaking for the court in Parsons
v. Bristol De1l. Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861,865 [2] [44 Cal.Rptr.
767, 402 P.2d 839], and in Coast Bank v. Minderhout (1964)
61 Cal.2d 311,315 [38 Cal.Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265], such evidence is "admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to
give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible."
(Italics added.) Or, as stated by the same author, concurring
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in Laux v. Freed (1960) 53 Ca1.2d 512, 527 [2 Cal.Rptr. 265,
348 P.2d 873], "extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 'add to,
detract from, or vary its terms.' " (Italics added.)
At the outset the majority in the present case reiterate3 that
the rule against contradicting or varying the terms of a writing remains applicable when only part of the agreement is
contained in the writing, and parol evidence is used to prove
elements of the agreement not reduced to writing. But having
restated this established rule, the majority opinion inexplicably proceeds to subvert it.
Each of the three cases cited by the majority (fn. 3, ante)
holds that although parol evidence is admissible to prove the
parts of the contract not put in writing, it is not admissible
to vary or contradict the writing or prove collateral agreements which are inconsistent therewith. The meaning of this
rule (and the application of it found in the cases) is that if
the asserted unwritten elements of the agreement would contradict, add to, detract from, vary or be inconsistent with the
written agree~ent, then such elements may not be shown by
parol evidence.
The contract of sale and purchase of the ranch property
here inv.olved was carried out through a title company upon
written escrow instructions executed by the respective parties
after various preliminary negotiations. The deed to defendant
. grantees, in which the grantors expressly reserved an option to
repurchase the property within a ten-year period and upon a
specified consideration, was issued and delivered in consummation of the contract. In neither the written escrow instructions nor the deed containing the option is there any language
even suggesting that the option was agreed or intended by the
parties to be personal to the grantors, and so nonassignable.
The trial judge, on at least three separate occasions, correctly
sustained objections to efforts of defendant optionors to get
into evidence the testimony of Dallas Masterson (the bankrupt
holder of the option) that a part of the agreement of sale of the
parties was that the option to repurchase the property was
personal to him, and therefore unassignable for benefit of
creditors. But the majority hold that that testimony should
have been admitted, thereby permitting defendant optionors
8Citing three California eases (ante, p. 225) ; Hulse v. Juillard Fancy
Food8 Co. (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 571, 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529, 394 P.2d 65];
SchwartB v. Shapiro (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 238, 250 [40 Cal.Rptr. 189];
Mangini v. Wolf8chmidt, Ltd. (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 192, 200-201 [331
P.2d 728].
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to limit, detract from and contradict the plain and unrestricll'd t,.'rIllS of the written option in clear viulation of tile
parol cvidl'nce rule and to open the door to the perpetration of
fraud.
Options are property, and are widely used in the sale and
purchase of real and personal property. One of the basic incidents of property ownership is the right of the owner to sell
or transfer it. The author of the present majority opinion,
speaking for the court in Fannland Irr. CO. Y. Dopplmaier
(1957) 48 Ca1.2d 208, 222 [308 P.2d 732, 66 A.L.R2d 590], put
it this way: "The statutes in this state clearly manifest a policy in favor of the free transferability of all types of property,
including rights under contracts."4 (Citing Civ. Code,
§§ 954, 1044, 1458 n ; see also 40 Cal.Jur.2d 289-291, and cases
there cited.) These rights of the owner of property to transfer
it. C(;nfirlfled, by the cited code sections, are elementary rules
of substantive law and not the mere disputable presumptions
which the majority opinion ill :the present case would make of
them, Moreoyer, the right of tt-ansferability applies to an option to purchase, unless there are words of limitation in the
option forbillJing its assig-ulllrnt or showing that it was given
because of a peculiar trust or confidence reposed in the optiol1('e. (Mott v. Cline (1927) 200 Cal. 434, 450 [11] [253 P.
718] ; Prichard v. I{imba.ll (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764-765 [4,5]
[214 P. 863] ; Altman v. Blewett (1928) 93 Cal.App. 516, 525
pq [269 P. 751] ; see also 5 Cal.Jur.2d 393, 395.396, and cases
there cited.) Thus, in Prichard t.he language of the document
'itself (a written, expressly nonassignable lease, with option to
buy) was held to establish the trust or confidence reposed in
the optionee and so to negate assignability of the option.
'l'he right of an optionee to transfer his option to purchase
property is accordingly one of the basic rights which accompanies the option unless limited under the language of the option itself. '1'0 allow an optionor to resort to parol evidence to
snpport his assertion that the written option is not transferable
4Thc opinion contillues: "The terms and purpose of a contract may
show, however, thot it was intended to be nonassignable." With this
'lu:t1ifie:tlion of the gencral rulc I am in accord, but here it is inapplicable
as languagc indicoting any intention whatever to restrict assignability
is eompletely nonexi~tcnt.
flRcetion 1OH: "Property of any kind may be trollsferrcd, except as
otherwise provided by this articlc." The only property the article pro·
vides cannot be transfcrred is "A mere possibility, not con pled with an
interest." (§ 1045.)
Section 1458: "A l'ight arising out of an obligation is the property of
the person to whom it is due, and may be transferred as such."

)

!

I
I

I

)

Feb. 1968]

MASTERSON V. SINE
[68 C.2d 222; 65 Cal.Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561)

235

is to authorize him to limit the option by attempting to restrict
and reclaim rights with which hc has already parted. A
clearer violation of two substantive and basic rules of lawthe parol evidence rule and the right of free transferability of
property-would be difficult to conceive.
The majority opinion attempts to buttress its approach by
asserting (ante, p. 226) that "California cases have stated
that whether there was an integration is to be determined solely from the face of the instrument [citations), and that the
question for the court is whether it 'appears t{) be a complete
. . . agreement. . . . [citations],~' but that "Neither of these
strict formulations of the rule . . . has been consistently applied. "
The majority's claim of inconsistent application of the
parol evidence rule by the California courts fails to find support in the examples offered. First, the majority opinion
asserts (ante, p. 226) that "The requirement that the writing must appear incomplete on its face has been repudiated ill many cases where parol evidence was admitted 'to
prove the existence of a separate oral agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent and which is not inconsistent with its terms '-even though the instrument appeared
to state a complete agreement. [Citations.]" But an examination of the cases cited in support of the quoted statement discloses that on the contrary in every case which is pertinent
here (with a single exception) the writing was obviously incomplete on its face. s In the one exception (Stockburger v.
Dolan (1939) 14 Ca1.2d 313, 317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.L.R. 83])
it was held that lessors under a lease to drill for oil in an area
zoned against such drilling should be permitted to show by
parol that the lessee had contemporaneously agreed orally to
seek a variance-an agreement which, as the opinion points
out, did not contradict the written contract. But what is additionally noteworthy in Stockburger, and controlling here, is
6Thus in American Industrial Sales Corp. v. Airscope, Inc. (1955) 44
Ca1.2d 393, 397 [282 P.2d 504,49 A.L.R.2d 1344), the contract was silent
as t.o the place of paymrnt for property purchased; in Crawford v.
France (1933) 219 Cal. 439, 443 [27 P.2d 645), a contract for an archi·
tect's fee basecl upon the eost of a building was s'ilent as to such cost;
in Buckner v. A. Leon 4' Co. (1928) 204 Cal. 225, 227 [267 P. 693], a
contract for sale and purchase of grapes was silent as to which party
was to furnish the lug boxes required for delivery; ill Sivers v. Sivers
(1893) 97 Cal. 518, 521 [32 P. 571], a written agreement to repay money
loaned was silent as to the time for payment; and Simmons v. California
Institute of Technology (1949) 34 Cal.2d 264, 274 [9) [209 P.2d 581],
was a case of fra'ud in the inducement and not one of parol evidence to
show a promise or agreement inconsistent with the written contract.
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the further holding that lessors could not show by parol that
lessee had orally agreed that a lease provision suspending payment of rental under certain circumstances would not apply
during certain periods of time-as "evidence to that effect
would vary the terms of the contract in that particular .... "
(P. 317 [5] of 14 CaI.2d.)
In further pursuit of what would appear to be nonexistent
support for its assertions of inconsistency in California cases,
the majority opinion next declares (ante, p. 226) that "Even
under the rule that the writing alone is to be consulted, it was
found necessary to examine the alleged collateral agreement
before concluding that proof of it was precluded by the writing
alone. (See 3 Corbin, Contracts (1960) § 582, pp. 444-446.) "
Not only are no California cases cite(Z by the majority in supposed support for the quoted declaration (offered by the majority as an example of inconsistent applications of the parol
evidence rule 'by California courts), but 3 Corbin, Contracts,
which the majority do cite, likewise refers to no California
cases, and makes but scanty citation to any cases whatever.
In any event, in what manner other than by "examining" an
alleged collateral agreement is it possible for a court to rule
upon the admissibility of testimony or upon an offer of proof
with respect to such agreement'
The majority opinion has thus demonstrably failed to substantiate its next utterance (ante, pp. 226-227) that" 'The conception of a writing as wholly and intrinsically self-determinative of the parties' intent to make it a sole memorial of one
or seven or twenty-seven snbjects of negotiation is an impossible one,' " citing 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) section
2431, page 103, whose views on the subject were rejected by
this court as early as 1908 in Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. Armsby Co., 153 Cal. 585, 595 [96 P. 319], which, indeed, is also
citcd by the majority in the present case. And the example
given, that of a promissory note, is obviously specious. Rarely,
if ever, does a promissory note given by a debtor to his creditor
integrate all their agreements (that is not the purpose it
serves) ; it mayor it may not integrate all their present contractual rights and obligations; but relevant to the parol evidence rule, at least until the advent of the majority opinion in
this case, alleged collateral agreements which would vary or
cuntradict the terms and conditions of a promissory note may
not be shown by parol. (Bank of Amcrica etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass (1935) 4 Cal.2d 258, 263-264 [6] [48 P.2d 659].)
Upon this structure of incorrect premises a~d ~nfQQnded
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assertions the majority opinion arrives at its climax: The pronouncement of ,. several policies [to] be accommodated . . .
[i]n formulating the rule governing parol evidence." (Italics
added.) 7 Two of the "policies" as declared by the majority
are: Written evidence is more accurate than human memory8 j fraud or unintentional invention by interested witnesses
may well occur.
I submit that these purported" policies" are in reality two
of the basic and obvious reasons for adoption by the Legislature
of the parol evidence rule as the policy in this state. Thus the
speculation of the majority (ante, pp. 227-228) concerning
the views of various writers on the subject and the advisability
of following them in this state is not only superfluous but flies
flatly in the face of established California law and policy. It
serves only to introduce uncertainty and confusion in a field
of substantive law which was codified and made certain in this
state a century ago.
However, despite the law which until the advent of the present majority opinion has been firmly and clearly established
in California and relied upon by attorneys and courts alike,
that parol evidence may not be employed to vary or contradict
the terms of a written instrument, the majority now announce
(ante, p. 227) that such evidence "should be excluded only
when the fact finder is likely to be misled, " and that" The rule
must therefore be based on the credibility of the evidence."
(Italics added.) But was it not, inter alia, to avoid misleading
the fact finder, and to further the introduction of only the evidence which is most likely to be credible (the written document), that the Legislature adopted the parol evidence rule as
a part of the substantive law of this state Y
Next, in an effort to implement this newly promulgated
"credibility" test, the majority opinion offers a choice of two
"standards": one, a "certainty" standard, quoted from the
Uniform Commercial CodeD (ante, p. 228), and the other a
7Jt is the Legislature of this state which did the formulating of the
rule governing parol evidence nearly a century ago when in 1872, as
previously noted, sections 1625 of the Civil Code and 1856 of the Code
of Civil Procedure were adopted. And as already shown herein, the rule
has since been consistently applied by the cOllrts of this state. The parol
evidence rule as thus luid do\Vll by the Legislature and applied by the
courts is the policy of this state.
8Although the majOl'ity declare that tbis first "policy" may be served
by excluding parol evidenee of agreements that directly contradict the
writing, such contradiction is precisely the effect of the agreement sought
to be shown by parol in this case.
9" If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would
certainly have been included in the document in the view of the court,
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"natural" standard found in the Restatement of Contracts10
(ante, p. 227), and concludes (ante, p. 228) that at least for
purposes of the present case the" natural" viewpoint should
prevail.
This new rule, not hitherto recognized in California, provides that proof of a claimed collateral oral agreement 'is admissible if it is such an agreement as might naturally have
been made a separate agreement by the parties under the particular circumstances. I submit that this approach opens the
door to uncertainty and confusion. Who can know what its
limits are YCertainly I do not. For example, in its application
to this case who could be expected to divine as "natural" a
separate oral agreement between the parties that the assignment, absolute and unrestricted on its face, was intended by
the parties to be limited to the Masterson family?
Or, assume that one gives to his relative a promissory note
and that the payee of the note goes bankrupt. By operation of
law the note becomes an asset of the bankruptcy. The trustee
attempts to enforce it. Would the relatives be permitted to
testify that by a separate oral agreement made at the time of
the execution of the note it was understood that should the
payee fail in his business the maker would be excused from
payment o~ the note, or tIlat, as here, it was intended that the
benefits of the note would be personal to the payee? I doubt
that trial judges should be burdened with the task of conjuring whether it would have been "natural" under those cireUlllstances for such a separate agreement to have been made
by the parties. Yet, under the application of the proposed rule,
this is the task the trial judge would have, and in essence the
situation presented in the instant case is no different.
Under the application of the codes and the present case law,
proof of the existence of such an agreement would not be permitted, "natural" or "unnatural." But conceivably, as loose
as the new rule is, one judge might deem it natural and another
judge unnatural,u And in (,Hch instance the ultimate decision
then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of
fact." (Comment 3, § 2-202; italics added.)
lOViz., proof of a collateral agrcement should be pClmitted if it "is
such an agreement as might naturally be made as a separate :lgreement
by partics situateu rlS were the part-irs to the written c'l11tr:l(·t." (Restatement of Contracts, § 240, subel. (1) (h) ; italics added.)
110r pel'llUps application of the new l'Ule will turn upon the opinion of
the court (trial or appellate) tl,at it is "natural" for one family group
to agree that in case of unfriendly approach by :l creditor of any of
them, then the debtor's propcl·ty will be transfera1le or assignable only
to other members of the fmnily, whereas such a scheme might be considered less than" natural" for other families to pursue_
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would have to be matle ("naturally") on a casc-by-case basis
by the appellate courts.
In an cffort to provide justification for applying the newly
pronounced" natural" rule to the circumstances of thc present case, the majority opinion next (ante, p. 228) attempts
to account for the silence of the writing in this case concerning assignability of thc OptiOIl, by asserting that "thc difficulty of accommodating the formalized structure of a deed to
the insertion of collateral agreements makes it less likely that
all the terms of such an agreement were included." What difficulty would have been involved here, to add the words "this
option is nonassignable'" The asserted" formalized structure
of a deed" is no formidable barrier. The Legislature has set
forth the requirements in simple language in section 1092 of
the Civil Code. It is this: "I, A B, grant to C D all that real
property situated in [naming county], State of California., ...
deseribed as follows: [describing it]." To this the grantor desiring to reserve an option to repurchase need only so state, as
was done here. It is a matter of common knowledge that collateral agreements (such as the option clause here involved, or
such as deed restrictions) are frequently included in deeds,
without difficulty of any nature.
To support further speculation (ante, p. 228) that "the reservation of the option might well have been placed in the recorded deed solely to preserve the grantors' rights against any
possible future purchasers, and this function could well be
served without any mention of the parties' agreement that the
option was personal," the majority assert that "There is '/'lOthinU in the record to indicate that the parties to this family
transaction, through experience in land transactions or other,Vise, had any warning of the disadvantages of failing to put
the whole agreement in the deed." (Italics added.) The facts
of this case, however, do not support such claim of naivetr.
The grantor Imsband (the bankrupt businessman) testifiecl
that as none of the parties were attorneys "we wanted to 1"011tact my attorney . . . which we did . . . . The wording in the
option was obtained from [the attorney] . . . . I told him what
my discussion was with the Sines [defendant grantees] and he
wanted . . . a little time to compo!'e it . . . . And, then this
[the wording provided by the attorney] was taken to the title
company at the time 1\-1r. and Mrs. Sine and I went in to complete tll e transaction." (Italics added.) The witness was an
experienced businessman who thus demonstrated ;H\'Ill"rnpss of
the wisdom of seeking legal guidance and advice in this busi-
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ness transaction, and who did so. Wherein lies the naive family
transaction postulated by the majority'
The majority opinion (ante, p. 229) then proceeds on the
fallacious assertion that the right to transfer or to assign an
option, if it contains no provisions forbidding transfer or indicating that performance involves elements personal to the parties, is a mere disputable presumption, and in purported support cites cases not one of which involves an option and in
each of which the presumption which was invoked served to
supply a missing but essential element of a complete agreement. 12 .As already emphasized hereinabove, the right of free
transferability of property, including options, is one of the
most fundamental tenets of substantive law, and the crucial
distinction would appear self-evident between such a basic
right on the one hand, and on the other hand the disputable
evidentiary presumptions which the law has developed to supply terms lacking from a written instrument but essential to
making it whore and complete. There is no such lack in the
.
deed and the option reservation now at issue.
The statement of the majority opinion (ante, p. 230) that
in the absence of a controlling statute the parties may provide
that a contract right or duty is nontransferable, is of course
true. Equally true is the next assertion (ante, p. 230) that
"even when there is no explicit agreement-written or oralthat contractual duties shall be personal, courts will effectuate
a presumed intent to that effect if the circumstances indicate
that performance by a substituted person would be different
from that contracted for." But to apply the law of contracts
for the rendering of personal services to the reservation of an
option in a deed of real estate calls for a misdirected use of the
rule, particularly in an instrument containing not one word
from which such "a presumed intent to that effect" could be
gleaned. Particularly is the holding objectionable when the result is to upset established statutory and case law in this state
that" circumstances" shown by parol may not be employed to
contradict, add to or detract from, the agreement of the parties as expressed by them in writing. .And once again the
quoted pronouncement of the majority concerning the show12Thus in A.merican Industrial Bales Corp. v. AirscoplJ, Inc., "'pra
(1955) 44 Ca1.2d 393, 397, the missing element was the place of payment of a note; in Bicllter v. Union Land etc. Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 367,
375 [62 P. 39], tI,e miRsing clement WIlS the time of delivery; in Wolters
v. King (1897) 119 Cal. 172, 175-176 r51 P. 35]. it was the time of
payment; and in Mangini v. Wolfsclimidt, Ltd., supra (1958) 165 Cal.
App.2d 192, 200, and Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 56,
73-74 [306 P.2d 1017], it was the dUl·ation of an agency contract.
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ing of "circumstances" by parol fails to find support in the
cases they cite,13 which relate to a patent license agreement,
held to be assignable absent terms indicating a contrary intent; a contract to sell grapes also held assignable; a contract
which included language showing the intent that it be nonassignable; a contract to buy land held to be assignable because approval of title by the buyer was held not to be a personal privilege attaching only to the assignor; and to contracts for personal services.
Neither personal skill nor personal qualities can be conjured
as a requirement for the exercise of the option reserved in the
deed here, regardless of how ardent may be the desire of the
parties (the bankrupt husband-optionee and his sister), "to
keep the property in the . . . family." Particularly is this
true when a contrary holding would permit the property to be
acquired by plaintiff referee in bankruptcy for the benefit of
the creditors of the bankrupt husband.
Comment hardly seems necessary on the convenience to a
bankrupt of such a device to defeat his creditors. He need
only produce parol testimony that any options (or other property, for that matter) which he holds are subject to an oral
"collateral agreement" with family members (or with
friends) that the property is nontransferable "in order to
keep the property in the family" or in the friendly group. In
the present case the value of the ranch which the bankrupt
and his wife held an option to purchase has doubtless increased substantially during the years since they acquired the
option. The initiation of this litigation by the trustee in bankruptcy to establish his right to enforce the option indicates his
IBIn Farmland ITr. Co. v. Doppl1llaier, supra (J957) 48 CaI.2d 208,222,
the court in bolding that a patent license agreement was assignable pur·
suant to the policy" clearly manifested" by "tbe statutes in this state
••• in favor of the free transferability of all types of property, includ·
ing rights under contracts," stated" The terms and purpose of a contract may show bowever, that it was intended to be nonassignable. Thus
tbe duties i11lposed upon one party may be of such a personal nature that
their performanee by someone else would in effeet deprive the other party
of tbat for which he bargained. '1'he duties in sucb a situation cannot
be delegated." (Citing La Rile v. Groezinger (1890) 84 Cal. 281, 283285, which held (p. 286 [24 P. 42. 18 Am.St.Rep. 179]) that a eon tract
to sell grapes from a certain "ineyard was assignable to the purchaser
of the vineyard, llS nothing in the eontl·net language excluded the" idea
of performance by another," and (p. 287) there was "nothing in the
nature or cireumstances . . . wllich shows that the skill or other personal
quality of the party was a distinetive charaeteristic of the thing stipu·
latE'd for, or a mnterial inducpment to the contraet.")
In Prichard v. Kimball, supra (1923) 190 Cal. 757, 764-765, next cited
by the majority, the written contract contained language showing the
intent tbat it be nonassignable (as already pointed out bereinabove).
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belief that there is substantial value to be gained for the creditors from this asset of the bankrupt. Yet the majority opinion
permits defeat of the trustee ano of the creditors through the
device of an asserted collateral oral agreement that the option
was" personal" to the bankrupt and nonassignable" in order
to keep the property in the family"!14
It also seems appropriate to inquire as to the rights of plaintiff wife in the optioll which shc holds with her bankrupt husband. Is her interest therein also subject to being shown to be
personal and not salable or assignable? And, what are her
rights and those of her husband in the ranch land itself, if
they exereise their option to purchase it T Will they be free to
then sell the land? Or, if they prefer, may they hold it beyond
the reach of creditors? Or can other members of "the family"
claim some sort of restriction on it in perpetuity, established
by parol evidence 1
And if defendants sell the land subject to the option, will
the new owners be heard to assert that the option is "personal" to the optionees, "in order to keep the property in the
Mastm'son family"? Or is that claim" personal" to defendants onlyT
These are only a few of the confusions and inconsistencies
which will arise to plague property owners and, incidentally,
attorneys and title companies, who seek to counsel and protect
them.
I would hold that the trial court ruled correctly on the
proffered parol evidence, and would affirm the judgment,
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March 6,
1968, und the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
McComb, J., and Burke, .J., were of the opinion that tIle petition should be granted.
Simmons v. Zimmerman (1904) 144 Cal. 256, 260·261 [79 P. 451, 1 Ann.
Cas. 850], held that a contract to buy land was assignable, as approval
of title by the buyer is not a personal privilege attaching only to tIle
assignor (the part.y to whom the scller agreed to sell). La Rue v.
Groezinger has already been shown not to support the majority's proposition here. And the last case which the majority cite, Coykendall v. Jack·
.~on (1936) 17 Ca1.App.2d 729, 731 [62 P.2d 746], involved a contract
for personal services, almost uniformly held to' bc nonassignable; it did
not deal with a contract or an option to buy property, which ordinarily
imposes no other obligation on the buyer than to 'make payment, as does
thc option now before this eourt.
HAs noted at the outset of this dissent., it was by means of the bankrupt's own testimony that defendants (the bankrupt's sister and her
husband) sought to show that the option was personal to the bankrupt
and thus not transferable to the trustee in bankruptcy.
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